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Abstract. This paper discusses unilateral sustainability policies for tradable re-
sources in closed and open economies. The effects of sustainability poli-
cies are modelled in an intertemporal, competitive framework by apply-
ing different sustainability rules which are introduced unilaterally in the
domestic country. The paper shows that no sustainability rule will lead to
a slower rate of extraction of the resource. Instead, resource extraction
is increased in both countries. It is also shown that the foreign country
may well gain in terms of consumption and real income from such uni-
lateral sustainability policies but not in terms of sustainability.1. Introduction
The impact of environmental policies on international trade has recently received con-
siderable attention. Several papers have dealt with this impact either in a Heckscher-
Ohlin framework or a strategic trade theory setting (for an overview, see Ulph, 1994).
In a Heckscher-OhJin world where environmental resources are an intersectorally
mobile but internationally immobile factors, strict environmental policies induce a
country to specialize on resource-extensively produced goods. This structural change
is the natural consequence of moving from relative resource abundance to relative re-
source scarcity. If environmental policies substitute for trade policies and markets are
oligopolistic, the impact of environmental policies is unclear. Whether a country has
an incentive to cut or to exceed the socially optimal regulation level in order to shift
rents homewards depends on the parameters of the model and the type of competition.
Both approaches assume that environmental resources are internationally immobile.
In some cases, however, environmental deterioration depends on the excessive use of
resources which are mobile across countries. The most outstanding example are fossil
fuels which are rarely used in the country of production. Mobility of factors is a fea-
ture in international trade modelling which has been rarely dealt with in a general
equilibrium framework (e.g. Svensson, 1984, Ethier, Svensson, 1986). One reason is
that factor trade and goods trade are in many cases perfect substitutes, and trade theory
has mainly focused on the structural changes associated with trade. When structural
changes may be caused by both features, there is no need to take recourse to factor
mobility when the conventional Heckscher-Ohlin model produces the same result.
From an environmental policy perspective, however, the impact on trade flows itself
deserves attention. If a resource is mobile, strict domestic environmental policies may
increase the resource imports from other countries. If the increase of resource imports
overcompensates the decrease of the domestic resource extraction, total resource use is
increased. This paper shows that this case cannot be ruled out such that a unilateral
environmental policy may imply an increased resource use. As we focus on the trade
aspect, we employ a simple model of one tradable good, one tradable factor, one non-
tradable factor and two countries.
There are two strands of literature which set the stage for the sustainability rules to be
discussed by this paper. On the one hand, the question was raised which investment
rule could guarantee a constant, strictly positive consumption level when production is
based on the use of capital and non-renewable resources. The so-called Hartwick Rule
(Hartwick, 1977, 1978) set up an investment calculus which ensures constant con-
sumption in a closed economy. Other papers (Asheim, 1986, Hartwick, 1994) have
considered necessary changes of this rule when resource trade has to be taken into ac-count. As these papers focus on the sustainability of a certain consumption level, they
deal only implicitly with the impact on resource extraction and resource trade.
On the other hand, rules have been developed by taking resource considerations of in-
tergenerational justice. The principle of intergenerational equity would require each
generation to use only so much of a resource such that it will leave constant the stock
which it has inherited. In other words, the resource extraction must not exceed its re-
generation. This concept is called "strong sustainability" (Pearce, Atkinson 1993) since
it sets a physical constraint for every single resource.
However, for nonrenewable resources strong sustainability is not a feasible and mean-
ingful approach because it would require not to extract any of the resource as the ex-
ample of fossil fuels illustrates. In addition, there is no reason why different resources
should not be substitutable, i.e. why the decrease in one stock should not be compen-
sated by an increase in another resource stock. Therefore, the concept of "weak sus-
tainability" was introduced (Pearce, Atkinson 1993). Weak sustainability as an inter-
generational equity criterion takes into account the limited but possible substitutability
of resources and requires not a constant stock of each resource but of the value of the
total resource stock. In this case, resources are defined in a wide sense including natu-
ral, environmental, and man-made capital, including human-capital. We will refer to
this rule as the rule of constant wealth.
The papers which deal with sustainability aspects in closed and in open economies
have not discussed the increase of resource extraction as a reaction on capital accumu-
lation as explicit as it is done here. As these papers and the rules they develop for in-
vestment originate from quite different objectives, we do not try to evaluate their ap-
propriateness. Instead, we take the above mentioned two rules as they stand, and we
discuss their impact on resource extraction, on resource trade when economies are
open, on production, and on consumption.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the model and the model assump-
tions. Section 3 discusses the two sustainability rules in a closed economy. Section 4
discusses four sustainability rules in an open economy and compares the results with
the previous section. In section 5 a numerical example illustrates the possible con-
sumption and income paths. Section 6 concludes the paper.2. The Model
The model is a simple version of the classical growth model with exhaustible natural
resources by Stiglitz (1974) which is extended to incorporate different sustainability
rules and international trade. The adoption and extension of this model is due to three
reasons. Firstly, in order to derive at some conclusions, the fairly general assumption
of linear-homogeneous production functions cannot be made. Linear-homogenous pro-
duction functions make no assumption about the behavior of the income factor shares
in the course of time, and thereby imply ambiguity at a very early stage of the model
which has not addressed trade issues yet. As we are strongly interested in trade effects,
we keep the tradition of the Stiglitz-paper and assume constant income factor shares.
Secondly, modelling intertemporal behavior under competitive market conditions en-
tails several complications unless the existence of future markets for all goods and
factors is assumed. These complications arise because under perfect competition it is
assumed that all resource owners base their resource extraction policy on a set of given
current and future resource and capital prices in order to maximize the present value of
their assets. If such future markets do not exist, an assumption is needed explaining
which price resource owners expect in the next period. Since we are interested in long-
run effects and indeed in intergenerational issues, we find that the lack of future mar-
kets is a more realistic assumption, and therefore this paper assumes that resource
owners expect resource prices to rise with the current price of capital, i.e. the marginal
productivity of capital.
1 This means that the agents use the Hotelling Rule for predict-
ing resource price changes. If we assume the existence of all future markets, we would
basically discuss a static problem without any case for policy intervention because it is
well known since Arrow and Delreau that the existence of all relevant markets guaran-
tees efficiency. As future markets do not exist, we also assume that trade is balanced at
each point in time (for a paper adopting an intertemporal budget constraint, see van
Geldrop, Withagen, 1993).
Thirdly, we are interested in a scenario in which doomsday is avoidable in principle
because any intergenerational rule makes only sense if every generation has a chance
to survive. Solow (1974) has shown that any production based on linear-homogenous
functions must be of the Cobb-Douglas type in order to allow to realize strictly posi-
tive consumption levels in the future.
We assume two countries, a home country and a foreign country, which both produce
one good Y by the use of two factors, resources R and a composite factor K. All terms
1 When future markets do not exist, the resource extraction policy of a competitive economy
is indeterminate and may imply too slow or too quick exploitation. See Stiglitz (1974).referring to the foreign country will be denoted by a star. Resource extraction will be
denoted by E and resource use in production will be denoted by R. Obviously, R = E
holds in a closed economy. Resources are extracted from a given exhaustible and non-
renewable stock which is denoted by S. The composite factor K will sometimes be re-
ferred to as capital and is, for simplicity, assumed not to depreciate. Good Y is the
numeraire in this model. Production is based on perfectly competitive market struc-
tures. According to the usual Heckscher-OhJin assumptions, capital is internationally
immobile. Resources, however, are assumed to be internationally mobile if economies
are open. Output of good Y which is mobile in the case of open economies is produced
with a Cobb-Douglas production function
(1) Y(t)-K(tJ-R(t)
1-.
The resource stock decreases through extraction such that
(2) E(t)*O, -E(t)-S(t)
holds. The dot denotes the first derivative with respect to time. Profit maximization




n denotes the factor prices. In order to restrict the analysis to realistic cases, we assume
that the price of capital does not exceed unity. The output/capital ratio is defined by
Resource owners will extract resources such that the growth rate of the resource prices
is equal to the interest rate at each point in time, i.e.(5) mirrors the Hotelling Rule for resource extraction
2.
From the production technology (1), profit maximization (3a,b), and the Hotelling
Rule (5), a number of identities for the growth rates of Y and R can be derived. The
growth rate of output Y is
Yft)
(6) gY - xM ~ «9K + 0 - «)9R
where gK denotes the growth rate of the capital stock, and gR denotes the growth rate
of the resource input in production.
Differentiating (3a) w.r.t. time and using (5) yields
(7) g¥-gB-ap(t).
In the case of an open economy, it is assumed that there is no intertemporal trade, i.e.
excess demand for goods and resources and the balance of payments should be zero at
any moment in time. The conditions for international market clearing and the balance
of payments are given through
(8a) Vt: Y(t)-C(t)-k(t)+Y'(t)-C'(t)-K*(t) = °.
(8b) Vt: R(t) + R'(t)~E(t) + E'(t),
(8c) Vt: 7tR(t)[E(t)-R(t)]+Y(t)-C(t)-k(t) = O.
C denotes consumption in the respective country.
The Hotelling Rule describes the extraction path for a closed economy or for the world
supply in open economies. We, therefore, need to make a specific assumption about
the local resource extraction decisions. We assume that both economies are equally
endowed with resources at the time of introducing sustainability policies. If the two
economies possess the same resource stock at time to, then the growth rates of extrac-
tion are also equal since they depend on the growth rate of the resource price.
2 (5) is the Stiglitz-assumption of short-run perfect foresight. It should be clear that any
policy which varies nK does only imply a revised expected change of n^ under these
assumptions.Before turning to specific sustainability rules, the growth of an unregulated economy is
modelled. In the case of - so to speak - laissez-faire, we adopt the standard assumption
that every country saves a constant fraction a of production and invests it in the capital
stock K such that:
Vt: K(t) = oY(t) t> g
LK- gK. - op(t),
a < 1 -a.
The superscript L denotes the laissez-faire case for both countries. In order to simplify
the presentation, we will only differentiate the growth rates. The qualification for a
will ensure that domestic investment is too low compared to a sustainable development
at least in the beginning.
If both countries invest the same rate and are equally endowed with capital and re-
sources at the beginning, both economies remain identical, prices remain the same, and
trade will never take place even if both economies are open. The growth rate of output
will be determined by (6) and (7) such that
(9) g^. =g^=-(i-a)|3(t)+ap(t)
holds. Similarly, resource extraction and resource use will fall according to
(10) g^. = g^ = -[1 -
Since gp-gy-gK,
(11) gi.-gi--O-
indicates that the output/capital ratio is falling as well.
We would like to stress again that adopting the Stiglitz-model with short-run perfect
foresight means that all resource owners choose an extraction path the price of which
follows the Hotelling's Rule. Since future capital prices are unknown to resource own-
ers, they adjust to policy variations through changes in their extraction path. Sections 3
and 4 will compare the bilateral laissez-faire policy with a unilateral sustainability
policy of the domestic country. This policy considers the voluntary saving and adds
public saving until the respective investment rule is met.3. Sustainability in Closed Economies
For the closed economy, we consider two rules:
(a) Vt: k(t)-*R(t)R(t),
(b) Vt: nK(t)K(t)=nR(t)H(l).
These sustainability rules require that the domestic country compensates its resource
use or its resource extractions by investment. If the saving in the laissez-faire case does
not suffice to meet the respective rule (which is necessary to face a sustainability
problem), governmental action will ensure that the sum of private and public spending
fulfils the respective sustainability rule. Rule (a) represents the well-known Hartwick
Rule (Hartwick, 1977, 1978) which requires to invest the resource rent in physical
capital. Rule (b) requires to compensate the resources extracted or used through an in-
crease of the present value of the capital stock by the same amount by which the value
of the resource stock has fallen.
In a closed economy, there are no repercussion of trade on the resource use of the do-
mestic country. According to (a) and (b), the growth rates of capital are
(12a) gj-(1-a)p(t),
(12b) g£ -~,
respectively. The superscript denotes which rule is under consideration in the determi-
nation of a growth rate. (12a) shows that a marginal saving rate o which falls short of
(1-a) leads to a too low degree of investment. As we have assumed that the price of
capital falls short of unity, ap" falls short of unity (see (5)) and the growth rate of (12b)
exceeds the growth rate of (12a). From (6) and (7), one may now compute the growth
rates of the domestic resource use:
(13a) gS--ap(t),
(13b) gR-^^-PCt).8
From (12) and (13) together with (6) we derive the output growth rates:
(14a) g'-0,
(14b)
Rule (a) guarantees a constant output level. According to (3) and (4), ap(t) = JtK(t).
Hence, the output growth rate of rule (b) is positive for empirically relevant cases be-
cause rule (b) leads to higher investment levels for all interest rates which fall short of
unity.
In a closed economy which employs production technology (1), consumption and the
change of consumption are given by
C»(t)-aY(t)















(16a) is the well-known result of the Hartwick Rule which guarantees constant con-
sumption in closed economies. The sign of (16b) is undetermined in general and de-
pends on P(t). Define
(17) ji(p):-p
2--p + ^-0 with
a aIf n(P) is positive (negative), C is negative (positive). (16) shows that a negative
change is guaranteed if a falls short of 0.75. For a = 0.75, a (3 which exceeds (falls
short of) l/2ce = 2/3, gives a positive (negative) change in consumption. Lower and
higher cc's require higher P's.
Before going into more detail, we consider the feasibility of sustainability policies and
the behavior of p. Only such investment rules are feasible for which investment is
smaller than total production, i.e. KsY. The feasibility condition can be written as
(18)
This condition is always met for the Hartwick Rule (a) but its is not automatically
fulfilled under rule (b). Since under rule (b) gjj - 1 - a/a , we need p > 1 - a/a . Given
this restriction on feasibility, (13b) shows that any feasible sustainability policy which
applies rule (b) is only possible when the growth rate of resource use is negative.
Additionally, we find from (12a), (12b), (14a) and (14b) that the growth rates of (3 co-




Under short-run perfect foresight of resource owners, P(0) is identical for all cases un-
der consideration (see footnote 2). If P has the same starting-point and the same
growth rates under all policies under consideration, P(t) is the same for all cases and
does not depend on the policy variant. Then, comparing (10) with both (13a) and (13b)
reveals that resource use falls slower if either of these rules is adopted. This means that
adopting one of the sustainability rules increases resource use compared to laissez-
faire investment. The reason is that increasing the capital stock implies a lower mar-
ginal productivity of capital. A lower marginal productivity of capital makes resource
extraction more profitable compared to resource conservation. Hence, investment
policies for a sustainable resource use accelerate resource extraction compared to no
sustainability policies. This means that both sustainability rules compensate for re-
source extraction, but that achieving weak sustainability as it was defined does not
mean that fewer resources are extracted. To the contrary, both rules require higher ex-
traction for achieving intergenerational equity.10
Since the output/capital ratio is declining over time, we are also able to reconsider the
change of consumption under rule (b). Figure 1 depicts (x(P) and the feasibility con-
straint in the a-|3 -space. Figure 1 illustrates that under rule (b) consumption may rise
or decline depending on the capital productivity and the production function. Suppose
that the economy starts with a (3 > 2/3 and a sufficiently high a, e.g. point A. Then
consumption will be falling. Since p" is also falling over time the economy will move
along the dotted arrow, hence consumption will increase after the line C = 0 has been
crossed. Later consumption will fall again and eventually the economy will reach a
capital productivity where sustainability will be infeasible.





4. Sustainability in Open Economies
We now turn to the analysis of a sustainability policy in an open economy. Starting
point are two identical economies, the home and the foreign country. Without any
policy intervention these countries will grow or shrink at the same rate, there will be
no trade, thus they remain identical. The imposition of an investment rule for achieving
one of the sustainability objectives will distort this symmetry and will induce trade in
the resource and in the commodity.
Under free trade, factor prices equalize such that - given the assumption about the pro-
duction technology - the factor intensities will equalize as well for all t:11
R(t) (20
) W)
Differentiation of (20) with respect to time leads to
(21) gR-gR.-gK-gK-
gK represents the growth rate of the capital stock under the sustainability rule and gK.
that of the foreign country without policy intervention. According to equation (21), the
difference in the growth rate of capital accumulation has the opposite sign of the dif-
ference of the growth rates of resource extraction. In other words, the larger the capital
accumulation under the sustainability rule relative to the growth rate of capital accu-
mulation in the foreign country, the faster will resource use fall in the foreign country
relative to the home country.
From the Cobb-Douglas production functions and (21) one can also deduct that the dif-
ference in the growth rate of investment is equal to the difference in the growth rate of
output.
(22) gR-gR. = gK-gK. = 9Y-9y.
Since we have assumed integrated resource markets, resource owners in both countries
follow the same extraction rules, namely the Hotelling-Rule. Consequently, extractions
and hence the growth rates of extraction are identical, i.e. ge = gE.. Differentiating the
market clearing condition for the world market for the resource (8b) and using (21)
allows us to determine the difference in the growth rates of resource extraction and re-
source use in production:




If the investment is identical, then the difference between resource extraction and re-
source use will not change either. If - as it is assumed under a sustainability policy -
the home country invests more than the foreign country, then the growth rate in ex-
traction is smaller than that in resource use. In other words, the home country becomes
an importer of the resource and an exporter of the output. This happens irrespectively
of which particular sustainability rule is applied.
The development of the two economies can be illustrated by computing the growth
rates of the different variables. For the foreign country, investment is still determined12
by the savings rate a. But since output and income are not identical in an open econ-
omy, the investment is not equal to that in a closed economy. Total income can be
written as
3
Given the Cobb-Douglas technology, income can also be written as
(24) r-
where m* denotes the import quota of resources for the foreign country and
%" - 1 + (1 - a)m". (24) is equivalent for the home country if all stars are removed and
the domestic import quota is used.
The investment rule of the foreign country is therefore
(25) K" -ol* = oY"|"
and the corresponding growth rate gK is
(26) gK.-o|"p
From (6) and (7), the growth rate of output and of resource use can be computed as
(27) g¥..(i-a
(28) gH.--(1-o|-)p.
By assumption, the foreign country does not pursue any sustainability policy. If the
domestic country also does not intervene in the capital accumulation both countries
will remain identical and trade will not take place. Hence | and Jf will in that case be
equal to one such that equations (23) to (28) also describe the non-intervention case for
both countries if | = |" = 1.
All variables are functions of time.13
Sustainability Rules for an Open Economy
The two rules of sustainability which have been discussed in the section on the closed
economy need to be differentiated further in the case of an open economy. Whereas in
a closed economy there is no difference in resources extracted, E, and resources used,
R, in an open economy they will differ. As a consequence one needs to define whether
the sustainability rule refers to the domestic resource stock or to the overall resource
stock. In the first case investment needs only to compensate for domestic resource ex-
traction, in the second it needs to compensate for domestic resource use.
The Hartwick Rule concentrating on resource use would then amount to
(a) K(t)-nR(t)R(t) Vt.
The corresponding rule for constant wealth of the economy would be
(b) nK(t)k(t)-nR(t)R(t) Vt.




Given the identity of the differences in the growth rates of the relevant variables in
equation (22), it is now straightforward to compute the development of the domestic
and the foreign country. Translating the sustainability rules (a) to (d) into growth rates
of capital yields
(29 a) g5-(1-a)P(t),
(29 b) g£ = —,
a
BibSiofhe^
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(29 c) gJ-(1-a)P(t)|g,
H(t)
Since the domestic country is a resource importer, the extraction-based rules (c) and
(d) require a slower increase in the capital stock than the use-based rules (a) and (b).





By assumption, the following relationships hold: a > 0 and 1-a > a. Also !="(t) - 1 if
there is not trade and (3(t) is falling since gp < 0. For a complete characterization of
(30 a-d) we need to determine the development of i='(t). As mentioned, at the begin-
ning of the imposition of the sustainability rule £*(t) - |(t) = 1. Hence, at least in the
initial period the growth rates of capital and output are larger at home than abroad and
the home country is importing the resource and exporting the produced commodity Y.
The examination of | and £' also gives further insight into the development of the
import quota for the resource. Differentiating | and 5" w.r.t. time yields
(31)
(32)15
Since gK > gK. - at least in the beginning - £ is falling over time and %' is increasing.
It follows directly that the import quota of the home country is increasing and that of
the foreign country, the resource exporter, is decreasing.
The appendix proves that the growth rate of the domestic capital stock cannot fall be-
low that of the foreign country, regardless which sustainability rule is chosen in the
domestic country. This has important implications since it also means that the growth
rate of imports of resources in the home country is always positive (see equation 23).
Resource use falls in both countries, yet it falls faster in the foreign country than in the
home country which pursues the sustainability rule (equation 21). From (22) it is also
obvious that output grows faster in the home country than in the foreign country. And
finally, the import quota of the domestic country is always increasing.
(33) gm = -|(gK-gK-)^r
and that of the foreign country is always decreasing .
(34) gm. = -|(gK-gK.)^-
Although the import quota of the home (foreign) country always increases (decreases)
it stays within certain limits. These limits, m and m , can be determined for the differ-
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1 - a - (1 + a)a
(35 d) m
d<rn< ' "
1-a-(1 + a)apa (1-a)(1-apo)
The limits to which the import quota of the home country converges under the differ-
ent sustainability rules are illustrated in Figure 2. Under the Hartwick rule with respect16
to resource use (a), the limit is the horizontal line m° intersecting the vertical axis at
the limit given in (35 a)
4.





If the rule for a constant value of the capital and resource stocks is used (b) the limit
for the home country's import share is an increasing function over time because the
capital productivity p is falling over time. The import share m" will also reach a limit
at that point in time t" in which the feasibility constraint, af5 > 1-a, is violated. The
reason for such a limit originates from the constant growth rate of investment which
eventually violates the feasibility constraint of non-negative consumption since output
is falling over time. This is illustrated in Figure 2 by the maximum import share m
which intersects the largest feasible limit m = (1 - a)(2 - a(1 + a))"' at time t". Beyond
the time t", the sustainability rule cannot be followed any more. Similarly, we get for
rule(d) m
w = (1-a)(1-(1 + a)o)-\
Under the extraction-based rules the same patterns emerges. The extraction-based
Hartwick rule (c) leads to import shares approaching a constant which lies above that
of rule (a) for reasonable parameter values of a and o. The constant overall capital
stock required by rule (d) has an increasing import share such that the feasibility con-
straint on the investment rule will be binding like in the corresponding rule (b).
4 For. half way realistic values of a = 0,75 and a = 0,15 one can compute the limit as
m_i-.= 0,42. The corresponding export quota of the foreign country, i.e. exports divided by
resource extraction, is 0.30.17
The development of output, income, etc. of the home country and the foreign country
can now be described, although not in detail for all variables. The most straightforward
results can be computed for rule (a).
As in the case of a closed economy the output in the home country does not change,
i.e. gy - 0. Income, however, falls since g, - gY +gE withg6 < 0. Resource imports are
increasing as is the import quota. However, the import quota converges towards the
limit given in (35 a). In the closed economy, constant output also implies constant con-
sumption (equation 15). This is not the case in the open economy. The growth rate in
consumption can be derived from differentiating the identity C - SjY - K under the in-
vestment rule (a):
(36)
Since gy - 0 and gs < 0, consumption will fall.
The results for the foreign country are not so obvious. It is a net exporter of the re-
source and its output is falling (see equation (27) and the appendix). It is unclear
whether income rises since g,. - gY. + g5. with g5 < 0 and g5. > 0. Consequently, the
consumption path cannot be predicted as well.
If the Hartwick rule is applied to the rents from resource extraction instead of those
from resource use, then the output in the home country will no longer remain constant.
Under rule (c) investment will not be high enough to sustain a constant output. The
growth rate of output is then g£ —(1 - a) |3m where both p and m are positive and
declining. The sign of the growth rate of income is negative but that of consumption
cannot be determined. By substituting the sustainability rule (c) into the consumption
identity one can compute
(37) C°>0 if £m- + (i-
As £' approaches its limit, the last bracket will become zero such that eventually C
c
has a negative sign but one cannot determine whether it might have had a positive sign
for lower |". The reason for this result stems from the fact that the investment under
rule (c) is smaller than under rule (a). Hence consumption may be increasing for a
while although output and income is falling.18
The rules of constant wealth produce conditions for a positive change in consumption
for which an intuitive interpretation can not be given. One may, however, discuss the
impact on production. The growth rates of production amount to
(38b) g>- —-[i-a]p(t) and
(38d) g^l^||-[i-a
Because the price of capital ap* was assumed to fall short of unity, (38b) shows that
production is increased under rule (b). Under rule (d), production is increasing at the
beginning of sustainability policies, but may decline with an increasing import quota.
We are now able to compare the growth paths of the two economies with and without
sustainability rules. Again, determining the growth rates of |3 for the different policies
shows that
(39) g;-gj-g;-g?--(i-a)p(t)
holds for all cases. As |3(0) is identical for all cases, identical growth rates imply iden-
tical P(t) for all cases under consideration.
The comparison of growth paths under sustainability policies with those under laissez-
faire is straight forward. First, we observe that g^ rises by switching from laissez faire





holds because gK does never fall short of gK.. (41) shows that both growth rates of the
resource use exceed the corresponding laissez-faire growth rates. From (23), we know
that19
m
is valid. (42) demonstrates that the growth rate of extractions falls short of (exceeds)
the growth rate of the resource use in the domestic (foreign) country. From (41) and
(42), we derive
(43) together with (42) shows that unilateral policies will lead to a further resource
extraction in both countries because both resource markets are now integrated. The
foreign country will export its increasing extraction such that the domestic increase in
extraction does not cover the increase in domestic resource use but imports are in-
creased as well.
If one compares a sustainability policy in a country without resource trade, we derive
from (6) and (7) that
(44) gR-gK-|3(t)
holds. Inserting (26) and (28) into (41) gives the same result. Hence, we may conclude
that domestic resource use is not changed under rules (a) and (b) when resource trade
is allowed. Because rules (c) and (d) imply lower investment in the course of time,
they imply a lower resource use. As a country engaging in resource trade is always a
resource importer, we find that the growth rate of extraction does always fall short
from the one of a closed economy. From this comparison, we conclude that an econ-
omy with a unilateral sustainability policy can slow down its resource extraction fur-
ther if it engages in resource trade, i.e. it can "import sustainability".
5. A Numerical Illustration
In order to shed more light on the behavior of consumption and income, we compute
the different sustainability rules in a numerical model in discrete time covering eight
periods. We use the following parameters and starting values: a = 0.75, a = 0.15,20
K(0) = K*(0) = R(0) = R*(0) = 100.
5 Discrete time modelling implies that the resource
price in period t+1 equals the resource price in period t times one plus the capital price
in period t. Hence, discrete time modelling leads to a slightly higher increase of the re-
source price than continuous time modelling because the decline of the capital price is
delayed by one period.
From this simulation, we find that production increases in the domestic country and
decreases in the foreign country. Furthermore, we find quite different paths for con-







Figure 3: Consumption in the domestic country
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5 The simulation is performed using the GAMS/MINOS software developed by the World
Bank*; The input files are available upon request.21
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Figure 3 shows that consumption in the home country strongly declines under rule (b).
Rule (b) does never reach the consumption level of the laissez-faire economy, but all
other rules eventually will. Both Hartwick Rules [(a) and (c)] and the extraction-based
rule (d) lead to an increasing consumption path. Hence, investment is not too large and
resource use is not too small to increase consumption in later periods compared to lais-
sez-faire.
Figure 4 shows that - compared to laissez-faire - the foreign country will be able to
consume more under all sustainability rules. Rules (a) and (c) imply decreasing con-
sumption in the foreign country whereas rules (b) and (d) result in a u-shaped con-
sumption path. Hence, the rules of constant wealth make the resource-exporting coun-
try sufficiently rich to eventually surpass their initial consumption level. This con-
sumption is made possible by the increasing demand of the home country for resource
imports which is paid for with consumption goods. This effect is also visible in figure
5 which shows that the income in the foreign country follows the same paths as con-
sumption. Since rule (b) implies the highest investment level in the domestic country,
both consumption and income of the foreign country will surpass their initial values.
The foreign country gains from the increase in the capital stock of the home country
and the subsequent scarcity of resources.22
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The analysis of sustainability policies on resource extraction in a dynamic context first
yields the result that compensating investments in the capital stock do not slow down
the resource extraction path. This result originates from the dynamic behavior of the
resource extraction decision which depends according to the Hotelling Rule on the in-
terest rate, i.e. the marginal product of capital. But since investment lowers the mar-
ginal capital productivity, the path of resource prices increases over time at a lower
speed than with lower investment. This is due to the fact that this model has no techni-
cal progress which increases the productivity of capital. Allowing trade in resources,
the country following the unilateral sustainability rule can import sustainability, thus
preserving its resource stock better than under autarky. However, even with trade it
cannot achieve a lower resource extraction path than without any compensating in-
vestment rule at all.
There are three escape routes which may reconcile sustainability policies with modest
resource extractions. Firstly, one may take the strong sustainability concept which does
not allow for substitution between man-made and natural capital. This concept, how-
ever, is obviously not apt to deal with problems of non-renewable resources. Secondly,
one may define weak sustainability as not adding the value of resource extraction to
the value of physical stocks but to another stock the marginal productivity of which
does not determine resource extraction. For example, if the value of extracted or used
resources is invested into human capital which in turn might influence technical pro-
gress, the marginal productivity of physical capital may be rising instead of falling as
in one case. As the marginal productivity of physical capital determines the resource
price change, resource extraction and resource use are likely to be more modest.
Thirdly, one may find that sustainability must be reached at by direct resource regula-
tion. Taxing the resource use may decrease resource extraction at a point in time but
not the extraction path. It is, therefore, necessary that taxation follows a dynamic
scheme. If resource use is taxed at a constant rate, Welsch and Stahler (1990) have
demonstrated that such a tax merely shifts resource exploitation from the present to the
future.
From this discussion, we draw two policy conclusions. Firstly, we find that trade in re-
sources may lead to an import of sustainability at the expense of unsustainability in
other countries. Unless the more unsustainable use of resources abroad raises no
problem, trade in resources stresses the importance of international policy coordina-
tion. Secondly, we find that the concept of weak sustainability should be redefined in
order to avoid investment into physical capital. It is not only useless but even harmful
just to accumulate physical capital as resource extraction in all countries and resource24
imports are likely to be increased. In this sense, increasing physical capital leads to a
faster exploitation of resources. The concept of weak sustainability should therefore
focus more on the productivity enhancing part of investment decisions.
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Appendix
This appendix will prove that !;* will never reach a level which makes the growth rate
of the foreign capital stock exceed the growth rate of the domestic capital stock. It does
so in two steps:
• Firstly, it proves that the foreign stock's growth rate can never strictly exceed the
domestic stock's growth rate. This result can be shown easily by considering the
behavior of the growth rates in the case of equalized growth rates. However, it does
not rule out that both growth rates coincide.
• Secondly, the appendix proves that the foreign stock's growth rate does always
strictly fall short of the domestic stock's growth rate. This result will be arrived at
by contradiction. We will assume that both growth rates coincide and will show
that the required slopes contradict the actual slopes at this point.
In general, the change of 2;* is given by
(AD rw-l^
As we know that |'(o) = 1, %* will increase over time. If the growth rates of the capital
stocks were identical, %* would reach a critical level which will be denoted by £'"
where x S{a,b,c,d} denotes the sustainability rule under consideration. %' would be
zero due to (Al). In that case, the growth rates of resource use and capital accumula-
tion remained identical, and the growth rate of the import quota were zero. Thus, (Al)
proves that the growth rate of the foreign capital stock cannot strictly exceed the
growth rate of the domestic capital stock because it cannot overtake. This result shows
that the foreign country's capital stock will always be significantly lower than the do-
mestic country's capital stock.
(Al), however, does not rule out that both growth rates coincide. The critical ^*'s for
which gK = gK. for the four rules under consideration are given in (A2).27
(A2) 5"(t) = —= const., £"(0) = —
CT a
aop(t)
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(A2) shows that the critical values exceed the actual values at the beginning of sustain
ability policies which are equal to one. Note that (A2) uses the feasibility constraint




^>(t)=V_^L = const. >0,
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Due to (Al), we may restrict the analysis on cases for which gK>gK-holds. (A3)
shows that the critical ^* increases linearly under rule (b) and does not increase under
rule (c). For rule (d), the sign is undetermined for gjj> gK- and the shape of the curve
is not known unless the relationship between 8 and the import quota is further sped-28
fied. We do not even know the change at the beginning of sustainability policies be-
cause
may be negative or positive. If (3(0) reaches the upper limit I/a, i'
d(0) is clearly posi-
tive, if p(0) reaches the lower limit (l-a)Ax (such that any sustainability policy is fea-
sible only in the beginning),
and likely to be negative for a high a and a low o.
Suppose that gK(T)- gK-(T) holds for a certain T < °o. At that time, the actual t,* is
assumed to reach the critical f *. When the actual £,* reaches the critical £,* in finite
time, and %* starts below |", the implication is that the slope of %* must exceed the
slope of f' strictly at that point. This requirement gives a contradiction because
(A4) |-"(T) - 0,
whereas Jf
x(T)- 0 by (Al). (A4) shows that \* will never reach %" for all cases be-
cause the slope of every §"" does not fall short of the slope of %* at T. Hence, both
growth rates can never coincide in finite time.